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Abstract 
Although the Ethiopian federal dispensation legitimizes political participation 
based on ethnic identity, the arrangement, both through design and political 
practice, has led to the skewed representation of ethnic groups. The article 
examines these challenges and argues that in addition to the existing electoral 
system, difficulties pertaining to the holding of free and fair elections, ethnic 
voting, the role of political parties and majoritarian decision-making 
procedures have severely undermined the effective political participation of 
ethnic communities. Moreover, the manner in which electoral constituencies 
are formed largely benefit the politically and numerically dominant ethnic 
group thereby undermining the representation of ethnic minorities. Yet, in 
some cases, notwithstanding the existence of ethnic groups with numerical 
ascendancy within an electoral constituency, the political practice ensures that 
a „favored‟ ethnic group, despite being a numerical minority, is made the 
political majority. In the veil of these obstacles, it is contended that a mere 
change in the electoral system alone, without due consideration to the 
aforementioned factors, cannot bring a full-fledged solution to the underlying 
problems the political system is facing.    
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From the very inception, the architects of Ethiopia‟s ethno-federalism promised 
a multiparty democracy1 and, vowed to undertake free and fair elections so that 
the hitherto marginalized minorities, not only administer themselves in their 
defined territories, but also participate effectively at federal and regional levels.2 
To this end, both the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
Constitution and the electoral law legalized a multiparty system. The plurality 
system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) was chosen as the best available route for 
guaranteeing equitable political participation.3 
Based on this assumption, five rounds of general elections have been 
undertaken since the transitional period. The incumbent Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its affiliates vehemently argue 
that multiparty democracy has been taking root and ethnic groups are being 
effectively empowered through these elections. However, its detractors dismiss 
these claims by accusing the government of, inter alia, setting up a multiparty 
politics, which it never intended to implement and employing exclusionary 
politics that stifles the genuine empowerment of ethnic communities.  
In the face of these accusations and counter-accusations, EPRDF and its 
affiliates have a (near) total control of the available political space at federal and 
regional levels. The narrowing down of the political space, among others, has 
resulted in an unprecedented level of mass protests immediately after the 
conclusion of the 2015 general elections. EPRDF quickly blamed the absence of 
opposition voices on the electoral system and announced its commitment to 
make adjustments –a change from FPTP to a mixed electoral system. Of course, 
a number of previous researches have also argued that in an ethnically diverse 
polity such as Ethiopia, where there exists a long history of competing ethnic 
nationalisms, the winner takes all approach does not seem to be a good choice in 
trying to ensure the equitable representation of ethnic communities.4  
In view of this, this article investigates the impacts of other important 
elements such as the holding of democratic elections, the role of political 
parties, the impact of ethnic voting, majoritarian decision making procedures 
and the less explored impacts of the manner in which electoral constituencies 
                                           
1
 See The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Peaceful and Democratic Transitional 
Conference of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta, 50
th
 Year, No 1 22
nd
 July 1991, Article 1(b).  
2
 Ibid, Article 2; the corresponding article to this charter is Article 39 of the FDRE 
Constitution, which also envisages for the self-rule and shared-rule rights of the country‟s 
ethnic groups or to use the constitutional term „nations, nationalities, and peoples‟.  
3
 Proclamation No 532/2007, The Amended Electoral Law of Ethiopia Proclamation, 
Federal Negarit Gazeta, 13th Year, No. 53, Addis Ababa, 25th June 2007, Article 25. 
4
 See infra notes 19 and 20.  
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are carved out. I argue that a change in the electoral system alone cannot bring 
tangible solutions to the challenges that are being faced by the political system.  
By examining the overall situation at the federal level and selected three 
regions of Benishangul Gumuz (BG), Southern Nations Nationalities and 
Peoples (SNNP) and Oromia, the paper seeks to assess the challenges of ethnic 
representation in Ethiopia. The analysis is based on the federal and regional 
constitutions, the electoral law, and primary data gathered from the National 
Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The choice of these regions is based on the 
following two legal and political considerations.  
First, these regions present a different set of ethnic majority-minority 
relationships. Benishangul Gumuz has constitutionally dichotomized the 
regional population into indigenous and non-indigenous favoring the former 
(which together account for a slight 50+1 numeric majority) in many aspects of 
political empowerment. Yet, the non-indigenous communities, not only account 
for an almost half of the total population, but also dominate some electoral 
constituencies. On the other hand, the SNNP region has a unique challenge of 
ensuring equitable representation for 55 ethnic groups, none of whom are a 
50+1 majority at the regional level, even if some are both political and 
numerical majorities in their defined zones and liyu woredas. Despite the 
political and numerical dominance of ethnic Oromos, in the region of Oromia, it 
is also a host to one of the largest number of both territorial and non-territorial 
regional minorities.  
Second, although determining and the setting up of electoral constituencies is 
the exclusive competence of the House of Federation5 (based on a study by the 
NEBE), the three regions have (for the purpose of conducting regional elections) 
used different ways in organizing their functioning electoral constituencies. 
Moreover, the three regions present a different form of political practice when it 
comes to the political participation of ethnic communities. While Benishangul 
Gumuz is ruled by an affiliate to EPRDF constituted only out of the indigenous 
nationalities, a member party of EPRDF but having allegiance only to a single 
ethnic group governs Oromia. Even if SNNP (like Oriomia) is ruled by a 
member party to the EPRDF, the regional ruling party has a unique onerous task 
of ensuring the representation of its diverse ethnic communities.   
The first section of this article examines the political landscape of ethno-
federalism in the wake of and after 1991. The dilemma between inclusion and 
exclusion in relation with ethnic representation in an ethnically diverse polity is 
examined in the second section. The third and fourth sections respectively deal 
with the criteria for setting up the electoral constituencies and the outcome of 
                                           
5
 Proclamation No. 532/2007, Article 20(1)(e). 
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the electoral constituencies in SNNP, Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia. The last 
section reflects upon the way forward.   
1. The political landscape in the wake of ethno-federalism: 1991 
and after  
The post 1991 setup led to the proliferation of different, mainly ethnic based, 
political parties. This was relatively an unprecedented move in comparison to 
the Derg regime, where only a single party was allowed to operate in the 
political landscape. Yet, in what can be described as continuity, EPRDF –
coming from a hardcore Marxist–Leninist past6 – strictly pursued the Leninist 
concept of a vanguard party, whereby other competitors were not allowed on the 
same political scene.7 
After 1991, EPRDF, arguably, declared a new frontier in the management of 
Ethiopian politics. The new paradigm was the hub of ethnicity,8 which required 
the body politic of the country to revolve around it. Affirming to this and in 
what appeared to be the widening of the political space, the Transitional Period 
Charter was declared in July 1991. Although the Charter was drafted by a wide 
array of ethnic based political organizations, resulting in the subsequent 
formation of many ethnic based and some multiethnic political organizations, 
the fact of the matter was most of these parties were carefully summoned and 
directed by EPRDF.9 
Since the transitional period up to now, the political landscape has, therefore, 
never been short of a plethora of parties running around the political field.10 But 
the major point of concern was –how many of these parties had independent 
existence without any form of patronage from the EPRDF. As many spectators 
of Ethiopian politics agree, to the exception of the 2005 general elections, in all 
of the conducted elections, EPRDF was only in a race against itself.11  
During the transitional period, two elections took place –the 1992 regional 
and local elections, and the 1994 elections to the Constituent Assembly. The 
outstanding result of these two elections was the withdrawal of many parties 
                                           
6
 Kassahun Berhanu (2003), „Party Politics and Political Culture in Ethiopia‟, in M.A. Salih 
(ed) African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance, Pluto Press, 
p. 120. 
7
 Merera Gudina (2011), Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolutionary Democracy, 1960s-
2011, Chamber Printing House, p. 156. 
8
 See for instance, Article 2 of the Transitional Charter.  
9
 Kassahun, supra note 6, p. 119. 
10
 For instance, from 1991 to 2002, some 79 parties were registered with the NEBE. 
Kassahun, supra note 6, p. 124-125. 
11
 Merera Gudina (2011), “Elections and Democratization in Ethiopia, 1991–2010” 5(4) 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 664, p. 670-673. 
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from contesting the elections –a result that can be ascribed to the careful 
maneuver of EPRDF.12 Consequently, elections during the transitional period 
were neither competitive nor free and fair.13 When the 1995 general elections, 
which brought an end to the transitional government, were held, as Lyons 
observed, EPRDF emerged as the single dominant party in the political 
system.14  
But during the 2005 general elections, things took an unparalleled twist. 
EPRDF, in part, bowing to national and international pressure, opened up the 
political space to an unprecedented level.15 The opposition parties were given 
access to the government controlled media and they campaigned far beyond 
their usual support base. By any standard, this was the most competitive election 
in the electoral history of the country.  
However, serious flaws ensued immediately after the elections.16 (1) EPRDF 
declared itself as the winner of the election, way before the National Electoral 
Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) announced official results. (2) The prime minister 
declared a „semi-state of emergency‟ banning all protests following the disputed 
elections. (3) Opposition leaders were divided between the propriety of joining 
and not joining the parliament. EPRDF eventually arrested those who did not 
join parliament, accusing them of threatening the constitutional order. (4) 
EPRDF stood on its two feet and subsequently proceeded to wipe out all 
opposition voices from the political arena. 
The general outcome of this was the closure of all political space and the 
promulgation of various laws,17 which (by many) were considered as tools for 
                                           
12
 Kassahun, supra note 6, p. 120 
13
 See for instance, Sigfried Pausewang (1992), “Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 
21 June 1992”, Human Rights Report 1. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 
University of Oslo.  
14
 Terrence Lyons (1996), “Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia” 
34(1), The Journal of Modern African Studies 121, p. 142. 
15
 Merera, Elections and democratization, supra note 11, p. 671-672. 
16
 For an in depth discussion on the 2005 general elections, see Jon Abbink (2006), 
“Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its Aftermath”, 
105(419) African Affairs 173; René Lefort (2007), “Powers -Mengist- and Peasants in 
Rural Ethiopia: The May 2005 Elections” 45(2) The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
253. 
17
 As Merera notes, between 2005 and 2010, the HoPR passed, among others, The Amended 
Electoral Law Proclamation No. 532/2007, Political Parties Registration Proclamation No. 
573/2008, Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation No. 
590/2008), Anti-Terrorism Law Proclamation No. 652/2009, Registration and Regulation 
of Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009, Electoral Code of Conduct for 
Political Parties Proclamation No. 662/2009, which, he argues, are carefully designed to 
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silencing any form of dissent.18 But this shutting down of the political space – 
which saw EPRDF emerge as the absolute vanguard party in the 2010 and 2015 
elections– was not without its consequences. In the wake of the 2015 general 
elections, unprecedented mass protests erupted, mainly in the regions of Oromia 
and Amhara. These protests, surfaced immediately after the government 
declared a hundred percent electoral victory, and this showed not only the 
awkward nature of the declared results, but also the seriousness of the 
grievances pertaining to lack of good governance, socio-economic inequality, 
and derailed ethno-cultural justice. 
2. Ethnic representation in an ethnically diverse polity: The 
enduring dilemma of inclusion and exclusion  
Among the three prominent electoral systems of majoritarian, proportional and 
mixed, Ethiopia has adopted a segment of the majoritarian system of FPTP, 
which requires the winner to gain minimal majority of votes (in single member 
constituencies) –both for elections to federal and regional parliaments. Many 
have engaged in the discourse as to which electoral system best suits this 
ethnically plural polity.19 It was the conclusion of several authors that equitable 
representation of ethnic communities in Ethiopia will be best served by a 
carefully tailored proportional representation (PR) electoral system.20  
                                                                                                            
silence any dissenting voice before and after the 2010 general election. Merera, Elections 
and democratization, supra note 11, p. 673. 
18
 Adem Abebe (2011), “Rule by Law in Ethiopia: Rendering Constitutional Limits on 
Government Power Nonsensical”, CGHR Working Paper #1, Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, p.1-19. Adem states that by using 
these laws, the EPRDF manipulates the judicial system to lock dissenting voices behind 
bars. 
19
 For instance, see, Yonatan Fessha (2009), “Ethnic Identity and Institutional Design: 
Choosing an Electoral System for Divided Societies” 42 Comp. & Int’l. L. J. S. Afr. 323; 
Getachew Assefa (2014), Electoral System and Political Pluralism in Ethiopia: A Case for 
Reform in Gedion Timotheows and Helen Fikre (eds.), The FDRE Constitution: Some 
Perspectives on the Institutional Dimension, Ethiopian Constitutional Law Series, Vol VI, 
p. 7-8; Kassahun Berhanu and others (eds.) (2007), Electoral politics, Decentralized 
governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University Press. 
20
 Some have of course mentioned the mixed electoral system as the best alternative, see 
Gebremeskel Hailu Tesfay (2017), “Reforming the Ethiopian Electoral System: Looking 
for the best Alternative”, Oromia Law Journal. Vol. 6 No.1, p. 1-28; Adem Kassie Abebe 
(2015), The Winner shall not Take it All: Proposals for Electoral Reform to Ensure 
Inclusive Political Representation in Ethiopia, available at:  
    <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/winner-shall-not-take-it-all-proposals-electoral-
reform-ensure-inclusive-political>, accessed on May 30, 2018. 
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Yet, in the wake of the anti-government protests, EPRDF, under a simmering 
pressure negotiated with (select) opposition parties and announced that a 
consensus has been reached to change the electoral system from FPTP to 
mixed.21 In the face of this development, this article explores whether the lack of 
alternative (opposition) voices in the political arena, since 2005, was solely 
attributable to the adopted electoral system, or whether it can be compounded to 
other factors as well.  
A careful observer of the 2005 elections, which by far was the most credible 
and competitive in the electoral history of the country, reckons that, even with 
the FPTP, a sizable number of opposition parties were able to win significant 
number of seats, both at the federal and regional legislative bodies. More 
specifically, in 2005, for elections to the House of Peoples Representatives 
(HoPR), leaving aside allegations of ballot fraud and vote rigging, the 
opposition, in total, won 174 seats out of the 547 seats.22  
Interesting was also the ability of some parties to win seats in the HoPR from 
constituencies located in regional states, which could normally be described as 
outside of their ethnic comfort zones.23 This fact was even more pronounced at 
the regional (state) councils. For instance, in the region of Oromia, out of a total 
of 537 seats of the state council, OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic 
Organization) won 387 seats (during re-election its number of seats rose to 399), 
the Oromo National Congress (ONC) won 105 seats (after re-election 96), 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won 33 seats (after re-election 27), 
Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement won 10 seats, and the Geda System 
Advancement Party won 2 seats.24 In the region of Benishangul Gumuz, out of 
                                           
21
 See for instance, Ethiopia to shift to mixed electoral rule, 
<https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/ethiopia-shift-mixed-electoral-rule>, 
accessed on February 1, 2018. 
22
 See Official Results of the May 2005 General Election, „The National Electoral Board of 
Ethiopia (NEBE)‟, <http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/announcement/251-official-
results-of-the-23rd-may-2005-general-.pdf>, last accessed 19 April 2016. 
23
 For example, CUD managed to win two seats in the region of Benishangul Gumuz out of 
the allocated 9 seats to the HoPR. Similarly, it won a number of seats to the HoPR from 
the region of Oromia. Although CUD was established as a non-ethnic party, many were 
skeptical of this and viewed CUD, even if implicitly, as a party dominated by Amharas. 
24
 Composition of the Caffee during the five round elections (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 
2015), i.e., after the establishment of the region and after the promulgation of the FDRE 
Constitution (document on file with author). See also the pamphlet issued by the Office of 
the Speaker and the Secretariat of the Caffee of the National Regional State of Oromia, 
document on file. 
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the 99 seats, the region‟s ruling party won 86 seats, CUD won 11 seats, and 
independent candidates won the remaining two seats.25  
Before considering this result in light of the electoral system, it is important 
to assess the manner of representation of ethnic communities. Non-indigenous 
ethnic minorities are neither represented at the HoPR from their place of 
residence,26 nor are they represented at the regional (state) councils.27 One is, 
therefore, forced to ask whether the constitutional architecture, present both at 
the federal and regional levels, ordains the representation of ethnic specific 
groups in the HoPR and respective regional councils.  
The FDRE Constitution states that members of the HoPR shall be 
representatives of the Ethiopian people as a whole,28 and a similar expression is 
found in the subnational constitutions.  However, a holistic interpretation of the 
federal and the regional constitutions reveals that the design –coupled with the 
political practice– envisions ethnic representation as the preferred form of 
representation.29 
The FDRE Constitution clearly states that “all sovereign power resides in the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia”.30 It further contends: “their 
sovereignty shall be expressed through their representatives”.31 Noting that 
sovereign power of the state is exclusively vested in the Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of Ethiopia,32 and that their sovereignty is expressed through 
representatives elected to show the ethnic composition of the state, it will be 
hard to argue that representation to the HoPR is non-ethnic. It should also be 
remembered that the ethno-federal arrangement has formed 9 regions heavily 
                                           
25
 Document from the secretariat of the regional state council on the 3
rd
 round composition 
of the regional parliament declares the number of non-indigenous representatives as 16. 
Another source indicates that BGPDUF took 85 seats out of the 99 seats. The rest was 
shared between Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), Ethiopian Berta People‟s 
Democratic organization (EBPDO) and independent candidates. CUD won 11 seats while 
EBPDO won 1 seat and independent candidates took 2 seats. See,  
    <http://www.africanelections.tripod.com/et_2005state.html#Benishangul>, accessed 12 
April 2015 
26
 For instance, in the region of Oromia, despite the presence of millions of Amharas, there 
is no ethnic Amhara representative at the regional council in the 2015 elections. Nor are 
Amharas represented to the HoPR from Oromia region. 
27
 In the SNNP region, for example, in the 2015 elections, the 55 indigenous ethnic groups 
occupy the state council alone despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of Amharas 
and Oromos within the region.  
28
 See Article 54(4) of the FDRE Constitution.  
29
 For the distinction on theories of ethnic representation, see Hanna F Pitkin (1967), The 
Concept of Representation, University of California Press, p. 60-91. 
30
 Article 8(1) of the FDRE Constitution.  
31
 Article 8(3) of the FDRE Constitution. 
32
 See Article 8(1) of the FDRE Constitution. 
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carved along ethnic criteria. Noting that this has (both numerically and 
politically) created ethnically empowered groups in the regions and 
representation to the HoPR, which normally is constituted from the regions, 
with strict language proficiency requirement for candidates to stand for 
elections,33 it should not be strange if representation to the HoPR is a reflection 
of this ethnic setup. 
As a matter of political practice, since the reorganization of the country into 
ethnic federation, EPRDF has largely sought to perpetuate ethnic representation, 
both at the federal and regional legislative bodies. For instance, at the HoPR, 
Oromo representatives exclusively represent Oromia, while Benishangul Gumuz 
selects representatives exclusively mirroring the indigenous nationalities. To 
date, at least on official accounts, regions being represented by a representative 
not from the dominant ethnic group or recognized indigenous ethnic minority is 
unheeded in EPRDF‟s political practice.  
Likewise, the makers of the regional state constitutions, arguably, seem to 
have envisioned their respective constitutions to ensure the exclusive control of 
their political space to the regionally empowered ethnic group/s.34 In fact, at the 
regional level, there is a direct link between the right to self-determination, 
which is reserved only for the regionally empowered group/s, and sovereign 
power of the region. Yet, as the 2005 elections have shown (and as will be 
discussed further down), the above intention/assumption of the Constitution 
makers might not entirely hold true if the electorate decides to vote along 
ideological rather than ethnic lines,.  
Under these circumstances, a question would arise whether a mere shift to a 
mixed electoral system can significantly change the realities, where the country, 
                                           
33
 Under the current rule of representation, each region has a fixed number of constituencies 
matching the number of seats at the HoPR. Accordingly, Tigray has 38 Constituencies 
(out of which 2 are special constituencies), Afar has 8 constituencies, Amhara has 138 
constituencies (out of which 1 is a special constituency), Oromia 179 constituencies, 
Somali 23 constituencies, Benishangul Gumuz has 9 constituencies (out of which 2 are 
special constituencies), SNNP has 123 constituencies (out of which 15 are special 
constituencies), Gambella has 3 constituencies (out of which 1 is a special constituency), 
Harari has 2 constituencies (out of which 1 is special constituency), Dire Dawa 2 
constituencies, and Addis Ababa 23 constituencies. National Electoral Board of Ethiopia – 
GIS Unit (2007), “The 547 Constituencies of The House of Peoples Representatives of 
Ethiopia”, document on file. For a wider discussion into the language proficiency 
requirement, see Beza Dessalegn (2013), “The Right of Minorities to Political 
Participation under the Ethiopian Electoral system” 7(1) Mizan Law Review 67, pp. 67-
100. 
34
 In some circumstances, some regions have made it possible for recognized indigenous 
ethnic minorities to have a say in the body politic of the regions.  
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by design, gives a head start to ethnic representation of the dominant group and 
importantly where it has not been able to hold free and fair elections to the 
satisfaction of all. In this respect, serious questions could also be raised on the 
positive outcome of the recent negotiation regarding changing the electoral 
system.  
The core of this agreement is: seats at the HoPR will be occupied using the 
mixed electoral system35 where 80% of the seats are to be won by using the 
FPTP whereas the remaining 20% of seats will be occupied using the PR 
system.36 First, if 80% of the seats are going to be occupied using the FPTP 
system, it means there is no significant shift. Since it is a political party with the 
greatest number of seats that will be entitled to form a government37 in a country 
where holding free and fair elections has not been made to the satisfaction of all, 
a party which wins 80 percent of the seats at the HoPR will be able to form 
parliament without any support from other parties holding the remaining 20 
percent of the seats. If the espoused electoral system is not going to encourage 
inter-party negotiations and coalition formations between parties with differing 
ideologies, it is hard to see any significant modification. To make matters worse, 
those opposition voices that might secure the remaining seats through the PR 
system, under a system of simple majoritarian democracy, will simply have a 
window-dressing role.38 
Coming back to the previous issue, in an ethno-federal setup, how the 
electorate votes (either through simple ethnic contours or by evaluating party 
programs) for political candidates is also very crucial. It is evident that the FPTP 
electoral system has not fared very well in equitably empowering ethnic groups 
in Ethiopia.39 But, one may doubt whether an electoral system can bring any 
                                           
35
 Nevertheless, in a country like Ethiopia adopting the mixed electoral system where seats 
are allocated on the basis of a combination of electoral systems runs the risk of 
overwhelming, both the NEBE and the electorate, because it is; (i) comparatively 
complicated and difficult to administer and (ii) quite confusing for the electorate. 
36
 Ethiopia to shift to mixed electoral system, supra note 21. It is also not entirely clear from 
the negotiations on whether regional councils will follow suit or a different electoral 
system can be adopted for elections at the regional level. Of course, the Constitution is 
very clear on this matter as enacting laws regarding elections is the power of the federal 
government and therefore what is decided at the federal level will be followed at the 
regional level. See Article 55(2)(d) of the FDRE Constitution. Yet, as the diversity of the 
regions attests and noting of the significant differences between the regions themselves 
regarding the level of their regional ethnic diversity, leaving the power of legislation 
regarding elections to the federal government alone seems a little bit ill advised.  
37
 Article 56 of the FDRE Constitution.  
38
 See the discussion under section 5 regarding majoritarian decision-making procedures.  
39
 Beza Dessalegn (2015), “Ethnic federalism and the effective political participation of 
minorities in Ethiopia”, Paper presented at the First Graduate Conference on Peace, 
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change where ethnic parties are the overwhelmingly available options and the 
electorate purely votes along ethnic rather than ideological lines.  
In a political system where opposition voices are not allowed to disseminate 
their party programs, freely address the electorate and are only encouraged to 
function along ethnic lines, the electorate inevitably functions along ethnic 
contours. This seems to have been the case for elections after 2005, as EPRDF‟s 
ethnic coalition and its affiliates are the only voices present at the federal and 
regional levels. Yet, as the 2005 election has shown, not every voting will be 
carried out exclusively along ethno-nationalist lines if there is a conducive 
atmosphere, even in a system of ethnic federalism and despite the tendency of 
ethnic communities to vote for a representative from amongst themselves,.40  
Taking into consideration the number of ethnic political parties available for 
competition and the lack of a strong opposition party challenging the incumbent 
regime, one may argue for a shift in an electoral system for Ethiopia.41 Yet, a 
shift without genuine democracy, in which the electorate is able to freely 
articulate its choices, is not a guarantee for the effective political participation of 
ethnic communities. In an undemocratic process, since the choice of who should 
hold political power is not decided by the „free will of the people‟, a shift in the 
electoral system alone will not bring about the desired result. 
3. Setting up the electoral constituencies: Under what standard 
criteria? 
In responding to the dilemma of empowerment and exclusion of ethnic groups 
in the political space since 1991, many have, inter alia, focused on the 
composition and impartiality of the NEBE,42 the influence of the electoral 
system, and to an extent, on language proficiency requirement for candidates to 
stand for elections.43 It is argued in this paper that despite the significant impact 
of the aforementioned points on the political participation of ethnic groups, the 
manner in which the electoral constituencies are formed –which has received 
                                                                                                            
Federalism and Human Rights, Institute for Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa 
University, p. 58-73.  
40
 For an in-depth discussion regarding ethnic voting during the 2005 general elections, see, 
John Ishiyama (2010), “Ethnic Partisanship in Ethiopia”, 16:3-4 Nationalism and Ethnic 
Politics, pp. 290-310; Leonardo R. Arriola (2007), “The Ethiopian Voter: An Assessment 
of Economic and Ethnic Influences with Survey Data” 3(1) International Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies 73, p. 73-90.   
41
 Getachew, Electoral System and Political Pluralism in Ethiopia, supra note 19, p. 29-31. 
42
 See for instance Merera, Ethiopia, supra note 7, p.168. 
43
 See for instance Beza, The Right of Minorities, supra note 39. 
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little (or no) attention– tremendously determines who is represented or excluded 
in a certain territory. 
Electoral constituencies after 1991 were established as per Proclamation 
64/1993 –a proclamation to provide for the electoral law of Ethiopia.44 
According to its preamble, establishing the electoral constituencies was 
necessary in order to have the draft constitution ratified by a body (Constituent 
Assembly) elected through the direct participation of the people.45 The major 
purpose of the Constituent Assembly was therefore to ratify the draft 
constitution, which was adopted by the Transitional Period Council of 
Representatives.46 
Proclamation 64/1993 takes woredas as a basis, and the whole country was 
divided into electoral constituencies.47 Each constituency elects a single 
representative,48 which shall be composed of 100,000 inhabitants.49 This cutting 
edge of 100,000 seems to have been chosen because the draft constitution stated 
that the maximum number of seats to the HoPR was 550 and the 100,000 people 
                                           
44
 Proclamation No. 64/1993, Electoral Law of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta of the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia, 52
nd
 Year, No 56, 23
rd
 August 1993, Addis Ababa. 
45
 See the Preamble of Proclamation No. 64/1993. As stated in the preamble, the Transitional 
Charter Article 11 envisages this from the very outset. 
46
 Article 11 of the Transitional Charter. The Council of Representatives of the Transitional 
Period, pursuant to Article 7 of the Charter, was composed of (unelected) representatives 
of national liberation movements, political organizations, and prominent individuals 
having a maximum number of 87 members. As per Article 9(g) of the Charter, the 
Council of Representatives established the Constitutional Commission, which was 
composed of experts‟ mandated to draw up a draft constitution (Article 10 of the Charter). 
With regard to the sequence of events, after the Constitutional Commission finalized the 
drafting process, it submitted it to the Council of Representatives for adoption (Article 10 
and 11 of the Charter). The Council of Representatives adopted the draft constitution and 
then presented it for ratification to the Constituent Assembly, for which its members were 
elected pursuant to the terms and conditions set in the final draft of the constitution. It is 
based on this sequence of events that Proclamation 64/1993 was enacted to enable the 
election of the members of the Constituent Assembly. 
47
 Proclamation No. 64/1993, Article 15(1). This, as the article envisages, was done without 
affecting regional boundaries. Regional boundaries at the time signified the 14 
National/Regional Self-governments established as per Proclamation No. 7/1992, A 
Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National/Regional Self-Governments, 
Negarit Gazeta 51
st
 Year No. 2, Article 3. 
48
 Proclamation No. 64/1993, Article 15(6). 
49
 Id., Article 15(2). 
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per constituency was found to be congruent with the then existing population 
size of the country.50 
Normatively speaking, (i) if a woreda has 100,000 thousand inhabitants, it 
will automatically become an electoral constituency on its own. (ii) If a 
woreda‟s population is below 100,000, it will become an electoral constituency 
by joining adjacent woreda/s, with the view of reaching 100,000 population. (3) 
If a woreda‟s population is more than 100,000, depending upon its size, it will 
be broken down into two or more 100,000-population categories thereby 
becoming two or more electoral constituencies.51 
However, in demarcating the electoral constituencies,52 additional criteria 
were put in place. By taking the woredas that were setup before 1966 E.C,53 the 
woreda population was made to, as much as possible, overlap with the linguistic 
map of the country that was prepared by the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian 
Nationalities (ISEN). The purpose of combining the two was to create an 
overlap between ethnic identity and territory so that the electoral constituencies 
were really in concordance with the demands of the Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples to self-determination – in particular with their demands of self-rule.54  
Based on this, the committee entrusted with drawing the electoral map of the 
country, by establishing which ethnic group is 50+1 in each of (or a combination 
of) the woredas, drew the electoral constituencies.55 Yet, even though electoral 
constituency boundaries were initially based on woredas, they in fact are not 
identical to woreda boundaries. This pertains to two important reasons. 
First, because it was impossible to find woredas that neatly fit the 100,000 
population margin of an electoral constituency, major reformulations had to be 
made. The following table explains this dilemma of matching population size 
with the number of delegates. As the table indicates, an electoral constituency 
                                           
50
 Interview with a senior GIS expert, National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, (Addis Ababa, 4 
January 2016) who was also the member of the committee that worked on establishing the 
electoral map of Ethiopia. 
51
 የብሔራዊ ምርጫ ቦርድ፣ የምርጫ ክልሎች እና ጣቢያዎች አመሠራረት፤ በየደረጃው ለተመደቡ የቦርዱ 
ጽ/ቤት ኃላፊዎች ሥልጠና የተዘጋጀ፤ ኅዳር 1986 አዲስ አበባ፤ p. 2, document on file with author. 
52
 The committee –entrusted with the task of drawing up the electoral constituencies– was 
mainly composed of professionals from the now defunct Institute for the Study of 
Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN). See, Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
53
 The reason given for this preference was: there was no adequate information as to the size 
and number of inhabitants of the new woredas (meaning woredas established after 1966 
E.C) at the time. However, the committee entrusted with the task of drawing the electoral 
constituencies argued that the population and size of the new woredas were congruently 
analyzed to include the previous woredas. የብሔራዊ ምርጫ ቦርድ, supra note, 51, p. 2. 
54
 Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
55
 Ibid. 
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can, for instance, be as small as having only a population size of 50,000 
inhabitants or it could be as big as having 150,000 populations, but under both 
settings, constituencies are only entitled to a single representative.  






Source: የብሔራዊ ምርጫ ቦርድ፣ የምርጫ ክልሎች እና ጣቢያዎች አመሠራረት፤ በየደረጃው ለተመደቡ 
የቦርዱ ጽ/ቤት ኃላፊዎች ሥልጠና የተዘጋጀ፤ ኅዳር 1986 አዲስ አበባ  
Second, this arrangement had to mandatorily deviate from woreda boundaries 
in trying to ensure that a certain ethnic group or a combination of ethnic groups 
(as is the case of indigenous nationalities in multiethnic regions) remain the fifty 
plus one group in electoral constituencies as well. For instance, in the regions of 
Amhara, Oromia, Afar, Tigray, and Somali, this has entailed an ethnic group, 
which constitutes fifty plus one of the populations of the region, to also 
constitute fifty plus one in the electoral constituencies.56 
In finalizing the work, since the draft constitution stipulated for 550 seats 
(out of which at least 20 seats shall be reserved for „minority nationalities and 
peoples‟), 550 constituencies were set up. 525 of them were regular electoral 
constituencies and the remaining 25 were designated as special electoral 
constituencies.57 These special constituencies were needed for ethnic groups that 
have comparatively small numerical size (unable to fulfill the 100,000 
threshold) compared to other ethnic groups, and as a result, they were unable to 
have an electoral constituency of their own.58  
At this juncture, a new committee was established to determine these 
„minority nationalities and peoples.59 The committee came up with more than 
thirty nationalities warranting special representation.60 In order to create an 
overlap with the identified nationalities and the remaining seats in the HoPR, a 
cutting edge of 10,000 populations was taken.61 Hence, an ethnic group to be 
considered as a minority nationality was required to have a population between 






 See for instance, Proclamation No. 64/1993, Article 2(5). 
59
 See, የአናሳ ብሔረሰቦች በሕገ መንግሥት ጉባዔ አወካከል እንዲያጠና የተወካዮች ምክር ቤት ያቋቋመው  




 It is not clear what objective criteria were used to arrive at these cutting edge numbers.  
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10,000 and 50,000. Based on this, their number was reduced from more than 
thirty to 22.  This meant 525 representatives elected from regular constituencies 
plus 22 representatives elected from special constituencies for a total of 547 
seats at the Constituent Assembly. 
A number of problems have surfaced following this approach. First, the 
electoral constituencies that were prepared for electing the members of the 
Constituent Assembly are still being used even after the approval of the 
Constitution and the high increase in the population size of the country. Apart 
from this, the regions, for various reasons, have rearranged their administrative 
boundaries, which have a significant impact on the electoral constituencies.62 As 
a result, elections since then are being conducted by taking, so to say, a middle 
ground between the two.63 
The electoral law, which is currently in force –Proclamation No. 532/2007– 
sets forth a new standard. Unlike previous electoral laws,64 it does not ordain the 
establishment of electoral constituencies based on fixed number of populations. 
Rather, the number of constituencies is to be determined based on the 
population census of the country.65 Since the FDRE Constitution fixes the 
number of seats to a maximum of 550, Proclamation No. 532/2007 does not 
change the number of seats at the HoPR if there is an increase in population. It 
rather allows changes in the number of population in an electoral constituency 
as the latter can only be changed through a constitutional amendment.  
The NEBE in its recommendation to the HoF for updating the electoral 
constituencies calculated the population of an electoral constituency by dividing 
the total population of the country (based on the 2007 population census, i.e., 
73,918,505) by the total number of regular electoral constituencies (i.e., 525).66 
It then recommended that each electoral constituency be composed of 
approximately 141,000 people.67 Based on this calculation, it recommended a 
change in the number of constituencies (seats) allocated to each region. For 
                                           
62
 The prominent reason for this was the rearrangement of regional as well as sub-regional 
boundaries as a result of referendum outcomes in territories contested between two ethnic 
groups. 
63
 Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
64
 This includes Proclamation No 111/1995, A Proclamation to Make the Electoral Law of 
Ethiopia Conform to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Negarit Gazeta, 54th Year, No. 9, 23rd February 1995.  It shares similar words with  
Proclamation No. 64/1993, with regard to the establishment of electoral constituencies.  
65
 See, Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 20(1)(b). 
66
 Letter written to the House of Federation from the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia 
regarding the updating of the electoral constituencies based on the national population 
census results, Megabit 8, 2001 E.C., document on file with the HoF, Addis Ababa. 
67
 Ibid.  
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instance, Tigray region will have its 38 regular constituencies reduced to 33, 
Afar will have an increase from 8 to 10, Oromia from 179 to 193, Somali from 
23 to 32, etc.68 This recommendation has not been endorsed by the House of 
Federation (HoF)69 and a new/updated electoral map of Ethiopia seems a highly 
politicized matter. 
This recommendation does not, however, clarify how the special electoral 
constituencies are to be updated. Proclamation 532/2007 simply states that 
“minority nationalities which require special representation shall be determined 
on the basis of „clear criteria‟ set in advance by the House of Federation”.70 
What is meant by „clear criteria‟ is yet to be clarified by the HoF. Yet, during 
the current negotiations, it was reported that the government has agreed to an 
increase in the seats of the HoPR by 110 seats.71 The basis for the calculation in 
the course of raising the number of the seats and the task of identifying the seats 
into regular or special seats –not to mention how the constitutional amendment 
will take place– are yet to be clarified. 
4. Outcome of the established electoral constituencies: The 
regions of SNNP, Benishangul Gumuz and Oromia in context 
As already mentioned, the power of determining and setting up electoral 
constituencies (both for elections to the HoPR and regional councils) is the 
exclusive competence of the HoF (based on a study by the NEBE).72 For 
regional elections, the residual power of the regions is to determine the number 
of representatives from each electoral constituency.73 According to the electoral 
law, the number of representatives shall be decided by regional laws of the 
respective regions (although the English version of the same provision suggests 
that such shall be provided in/by regional constitutions).74 For instance, in the 
SNNP region, the number of representatives from each electoral constituency 
                                           
68
 The number of regional electoral constituencies (in effect seats at the HoPR) is calculated 
by dividing the total population of a region to the population size of an electoral 
constituency. 
69
 Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
70
 Proclamation No 532/2007, Article 20(1)(d) 
71
 See for instance, The Reporter, Understanding the Electoral Reform, 
<https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/understanding-electoral-reform>, accessed 
March 11, 2017.  
72
 Proclamation No. 532/2007, Article 20(1)(e); as discussed earlier, this article is yet to be 
implemented. Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
73
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for regional elections to the state council has been fixed by a separate regional 
proclamation.75 
The regions use the electoral constituencies already established for 
representation to the HoPR76 for representation to the state councils as well. But, 
as the evidence in the three regions (highlighted below) illustrate, the absence of 
separate electoral constituencies for regional elections has led to different 
interpretations.   
For representation to the HoPR, the SNNP region has 123 electoral 
constituencies (108 regular and 15 special),77 which elect one representative 
from each constituency. However, for representation to the regional council 
(that has a total of 348 seats), the same constituencies are used with a different 
number of representatives. While a regular constituency, which has an assumed 
100,000 population, elects three representatives, special constituencies elect one 
representative per constituency.78 Accordingly, the total number of seats at the 
regional council shall be 339 (i.e., three representatives from 108 regular 
constituencies and one representative from 15 special constituencies). Yet, the 
total number of members of the regional parliament is 348. It is not clear how 
the regional government legally defends this discrepancy, but increase in the 
number of representatives at the state council seems to have been undertaken to 
ensure that 55 ethnic groups –considered indigenous to the region– are 
represented in the state council.79 
                                           
75
 Proclamation No. 105/2006, The Proclamation to Determine the Number of Members of 
the Councilors of the Southern, Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, Debub 
Negarit Gazeta, Awassa – Nov 19
th
, 2006, Article 3(1).  
76
 For representation to the HoPR, only one representative is elected from an electoral 
constituency. See Proclamation No. 532/2007 Article 28(3).  
77
 Constituency Map of SNNP region at Zonal Level, document on file with author.  
78
 Proclamation No. 105/2006, Article 3(1) & (2); populous ethnic groups have the biggest 
number of electoral constituencies whereas numerically small nationalities have to depend 
on special representation mechanisms. In this case, Sidama zone has the largest electoral 
constituency, which is 19 followed by Wolayita zone 13. See also, Berhanu Gutema 
Balcha (2007), „Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia‟, PhD 
Thesis, Aalborg University, p. 195. 
79
 Personal communication with the Head of Hawassa Branch National Electoral Board of 
Ethiopia (Hawassa, 30 May 2018); The NEBE branch head further argues that, although 
special constituencies can only elect a single representative to the regional parliament, in 
practice, some special constituencies elect more than one representative. It is due to this 
maneuver that the number of representatives exceeded the 339 mark. Still, the record, 
which details the composition of the members of the regional council, shows that the 
number of special constituencies exceeds 15. [The composition of the representatives of 
the SNNP Regional Council, Fifth Round General Election (2015-2020), document on file 
with author]. It is not clear if this increase in the number of special electoral 
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Out of the 55 indigenous ethnic groups, more than 30 have a population 
significantly less than 100,000.80 An ethnic group with a population of less than 
100,000 is, therefore, not in a position to establish a regular electoral 
constituency of its own. Since, each zone and liyu woreda of the region is 
assigned with a fixed number of seats,81 for those groups considered indigenous 
to a particular territory and that constitute numerical majorities in the regular 
electoral constituencies,82 their representation through the FPTP system is more 
or less guaranteed. For the remaining ethnic groups, that are unable to 
numerically dominate electoral constituencies and have their representatives 
elected, other mechanisms have to be used. 
When an indigenous group is found to be a numerical minority in an electoral 
constituency, special constituencies are established. In the sub-regional 
administrations of Bench-Maji, Kaffa, South Omo, Gurage, Segen, and Gamo-
Gofa special constituencies are established to make sure that indigenous 
regional minorities are represented in the state council.83 For instance, in Gamo-
Gofa zone there are three special constituencies for the representation of the 
indigenous regional minorities Oyida, Zayisse, and Gidecho, allowing each of 
these ethnic groups to secure one seat in the state council.84  
In circumstances where the aforementioned mechanism does not guarantee 
the representation of a desired/favored ethnic group, the other apparatus of 
ensuring its representation is the fielding of candidate/s exclusively from a 
certain ethnic group within an electoral constituency. For instance, in what 
seems to be a de facto recognition of Sidamas in Hawassa city, the region‟s 
ruling party only fields candidates from the Sidama ethnic group for Hawassa 
electoral constituency. The same is true for instance in Kembata-Tembaro zone, 
                                                                                                            
constituencies has been sanctioned by the HoF and in turn by the NEBE or an ultra vires 
act of the regional government.  
80
 See the population census results for the SNNP region, FDRE Population Census 
Commission, „Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census‟ (Central 
Statistical Authority 2007). 
81
 Interview with, Head of Hawassa Branch National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (Hawassa, 
11 February 2016); See also, Constituency Map of SNNP region at Zonal Level, supra 
note 77.  
82
 This conclusion is based on the following premises: First, electoral constituencies mainly 
use woredas as their bases; and second, a look at the composition of ethnic groups at the 
woreda level shows that indigenous groups constitute a numerical majority in almost all, 
save for some exceptions, woredas of the region. See FDRE Population Census 
Commission, „Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census‟ (Central 
Statistical Authority 2007) at the woreda level. (Electronic copy on file with author) 
83
 Constituency Map of SNNP region at Zonal Level, supra note 77. 
84
 For ethnic groups represented from special constituencies, see, Composition of the 
representatives of the SNNP regional Council, supra note 79. 
 
Challenges of Ethnic Representation in Ethiopia and the Need for Reform                          19 
 
 
where the Donga ethnic group is a recognized indigenous minority. In the 
electoral constituency of Tembaro two candidates are from Tembaro while one 
candidate is from Donga, allowing the Donga indigenous minority to secure a 
seat in the state council. 
Similar undertakings, however, with different intentions are used in Sheka, 
Gamo-Gofa and Gurage zones. For instance, Sheka zone (home to the 
indigenous ethnic group of Shekecho) is allotted with six seats at the regional 
council. However, an ethnic Kefficho (indigenous to Keffa zone)85 and Sheko 
(indigenous to Bench-Maji zone) have taken one seat each out of the allotted six 
seats. Likewise, Gamo-Gofa (for Aris of South Omo) and Gurage zone (for 
ethnic Hadiyas) have allowed ethnic representation at the regional council for 
ethnic groups not considered indigenous to the sub-regional administration. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this is done in recognition to the principle of 
normative representation, despite the ethnic background of the representatives, 
or for purposes of political expedience –entirely dependent on the wishes of the 
region‟s ruling party. 
There is also the language proficiency requirement. Since electoral 
constituencies in the SNNP are apportioned through zonal and liyu woreda 
administrations, the language proficiency requirement takes the language of the 
zonal or liyu woreda administration.86 It is therefore, under normal 
circumstances, impossible for a Gamo to get representation from Oyida 
constituency because he/she is unable to speak the Oyida language and vice 
versa. The language proficiency requirement ensures the representation of 
indigenous minorities despite their small numerical size in an electoral 
constituency.  
This approach has resulted in the skewed representation of ethnic groups 
within the region. Of those ethnic groups having a population below 100,000, 
except for the Mareko in Gurage zone, all have a single seat at the regional 
council. For instance, from the South Omo zone,87 the Dime that has a 
population of 457 in the SNNP (and a countrywide total of 873) has one seat at 
the regional council just like the Malie with a regional population of 88,436 (and 
                                           
85
 For instance, Kefficho is indigenous to the SNNP region but is not considered indigenous 
to the Sheka zone. 
86
 ZeMelak Ayele (2012), “Decentralization, Development and Accommodation of Ethnic 
Minorities: The Case of Ethiopia” PhD Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2012, p. 
467. It should be noted that the working language of the region is Amharic. 
87
 Based on the composition of the regional council available to this author, two indigenous 
ethnic groups of the South Omo Zone (Bacha and Brayle) and Majang of Sheka Zone do 
not have a seat at the state council. Composition of the representatives of the SNNP 
regional Council, supra note 79. 
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a county total of 97,925). In contrast, the Mareko with a regional population of 
only 56,827 (and a country total of 64,272) occupy two seats at the regional 
council.88  
In the Benishangul Gumuz region –home to the five indigenous groups of 
Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Como– for representation to the HoPR, nine 
electoral constituencies (7 regular and 2 special) electing one representative 
from each constituency are established. But for regional council elections, 
unlike the SNNP region, Benishangul Gumuz uses the woredas as electoral 
constituencies.89 The region is de facto composed of three zones of Assosa, 
Kamashi, and Metekel and Mao-Como special woreda.90 Assosa zone has seven 
woredas, Kamashi zone has five woredas and Metekel has seven woredas and 
Mao-Como special woreda is equated with a single woreda. Corresponding to 
these woredas, it means Assosa zone has seven electoral constituencies, 
Kamashi zone has five electoral constituencies, Metekel zone has seven 
electoral constituencies, Mao-Como has one electoral constituency. 
The peculiar thing about these electoral constituencies is that the number of 
elected delegates (representatives) differs among these woredas.91 For instance, 
each of the electoral constituencies (woredas) in Assosa zone sends six 
representatives to the state council. Five electoral constituencies (woredas) of 
Kamashi zone send four representatives each, whereas out of the seven electoral 
constituencies (woredas) of Metekel zone, four woredas send four 
representatives each. Two woredas send five and six representatives respectively. 
As will be demonstrated later, by looking at the ethnic composition of the 
woredas and from the perspective of FPTP, it is possible to argue that a skewed 
representation exists in the Benishangul Gumuz region as well. 
The region of Oromia has 179 regular electoral constituencies.92 Based on 
this, one delegate from each electoral constituency is elected for membership to 
the HoPR. The same electoral constituencies are again used for membership to 
                                           
88
 See, Composition of the representatives of the SNNP regional Council, ibid. 
89
 As mentioned earlier, the power to determine electoral constituencies is left to the HoF 
and the NEBE. But, it is not even clear to this author how Benishangul Gumuz  
government was able to decide on the determination of electoral constituency on its own. 
90
 De facto, because these zones do not have any constitutional backing from the region‟s 
constitution. 
91
 In this regard, the region‟s ruling party, unlike the case of the SNNP region, decided the 
number of delegates during the dispute between the Berta and Gumuz, during the former‟s 
claim for separate statehood. And this is simply taken for granted for elections conducted 
including the recent regional election of 2015. Interview with, Law and Security Advisor, 
Benishangul Gumuz Regional State Council (Assosa 17 May 2016); Interview with Rural 
Association and Political Wing Head, Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party 
(Assosa, 17 May 2016) 
92
 There are no special constituencies in the region of Oromia. 
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the state council (Caffee). Similar to the SNNP region, three delegates from each 
of the 179 constituencies in Oromia region are elected to fill the 537 seats at the 
regional council. Representation to the regional council is based on the number 
of electoral constituencies present in each zone. Each electoral constituency 
(supposedly) has an assumed 100,000 population.93 This implies that an ethnic 
group (other than Oromos) with a population of less than 100,000 is not in a 
position to establish an electoral constituency of its own.94 Based on this, it is 
possible to argue that ethnic groups below this number will find it very difficult 
to secure representation under the FPTP. Even if a certain non-Oromo ethnic 
group becomes capable of being 100,000 or more within an electoral 
constituency, without positive gerrymandering, it will find it difficult to elect its 
own representative under the FPTP electoral system unless the ethnic group 
constitutes a 50+1 majority within the constituency. 
The aforementioned ways of establishing electoral constituencies have the 
following implications. In the SNNP region Southern Ethiopian People‟s 
Democratic Movement (SEPDM) –outmaneuvering the electoral system– makes 
the ethnic representation of the 55 ethnic groups possible, even under the FPTP 
system through a careful use of the electoral constituencies coupled with 
political decisions undertaken by the region‟s ruling party. Primary in this 
regard is making use of special constituencies established for ethnic groups that 
are unable to establish an electoral constituency of their own.95 The second is 
employing the language proficiency requirement. The final and third mechanism 
is the decision by SEPDM in which a select ethnic group is fielded as a 
candidate in a particular electoral constituency. This, for instance warrants a 
decision to field a candidate who is indigenous to the region but not indigenous 
to the particular zone or liyu woreda. However, it still remains to be seen if this 
political practice will subsist once the incumbent of the region is not in a 
position to dominate the available political space.96 
                                           
93
 Interview with a senior GIS expert, supra note 50. 
94
 See, for example, a letter by the Zay People Democratic Organization, No 137/01/02 
(29/06/2002 E.C), addressed to the HoF, on file with registrar of the HoF, Addis Ababa. 
The party complained that the major hurdle behind the ZPDO in not winning a seat during 
elections, but it is rather the inability of the Zay people to establish an electoral 
constituency of their own as they are found dispersed in numerous electoral 
constituencies.  
95
 This is provided under Article 50(2) of the SNNP Constitution. 
96
 A glimpse of this problem surfaced during the controversial 2005 election, whereby 
candidates from the non-indigenous communities won elections in some electoral 
constituencies, particularly in the multiethnic towns of the region (like Hawassa and 
Dilla), „disrupting‟ EPRDF‟s carefully molded mirror representation of indigenous 
groups.  
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The limits of these approaches are self-evident. (i) 55 ethnic groups, despite 
all being considered indigenous to the region, cannot be represented in the 
regional council outside of their ethnic homelands (zones or liyu woredas).97 (ii) 
There is no place for representation to groups which are considered non-
indigenous within the region. (iii) The FPTP system significantly accelerates the 
dominance of the SEPDM by sidelining small parties, which cannot receive 
seats in proportion to their votes. This can be illustrated by the outcome of the 
2015 elections to the state council, in which all the seats in the council were won 
by the SEPDM although there were 21 parties in the contest.98  
In the region of Benishangul Gumuz, the impact of the setting up of the 
electoral constituencies coupled with the political practice has impacted ethnic 
representation in more or less similar ways. More specifically, in Metekel 
zone,99 in two of the woredas (Guba and Mandura), the Gumuz alone constitutes 
a 50+1 ethnic majority, whereas in two woredas of Wenbera and Bulen the 
combined presence of Gumuz and Shinasha constitute a 50+1 ethnic majority. In 
two woredas (Dangur and Dibate) no single ethnic group accounts for 50+1 of 
the woreda population. The combined presence of Agew Awi and Amhara in 
Dangur, Oromo and Amhara in Dibate, account for 50+1 population of the 
respective woredas. In Pawe woreda, however, Amharas constitute a convincing 
50+1 majority.100  
In Kamashi zone, out of the five woredas, in Yaso, Sirba Abay, Kamashi and 
Agalo Meti the Gumuz constitute a 50+1 majority. In Belojiganfoye woreda no 
single ethnic group accounts for a 50+1 majority of the population. However, 
the combined presence of Amharas and Oromos constitute 50+1 majority. In 
Assosa zone, out of the seven woredas, in five of the woredas (Menge, Kurmuk, 
Sherkole, Oda Bilidigilu, and Homosha) Bertas constitute a 50+1 majority. 
However, in Assosa and Bambassi woredas no single ethnic group constitutes a 
50+1 majority of the population, but in both woredas the combined presence of 
Amhara and Oromo ethnic groups constitute a 50+1 majority.101 
From the aforementioned figures, it is visible that out of Benishangul 
Gumuz‟s 20 woredas (electoral constituencies), an indigenous nationality alone 
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or the combined presence of two indigenous nationalities constitutes a 50+1 
majority in 14 woredas. It can, therefore, be argued that this numerical 
superiority, whereby the indigenous nationalities enjoy 50+1 dominance, 
arguably, gives them a head start under the FPTP. However, an argument can 
still be raised that several seats can be won (for regional council elections) in a 
single constituency, even though it is not numerically 50+1. Under normal 
circumstances, this gives opportunities to the non-indigenous minorities to win a 
number of seats even if an indigenous group or a combination of two indigenous 
nationalities dominate a constituency. A number of reasons could be raised to 
respond to the above assertion. 
The first factor relates to the non-existence of a strong opposition political 
party, which challenges the region‟s ruling party in elections and submit 
potential candidates in each of the woredas advocating for the political rights of 
the non-indigenous communities. For instance, in woredas like Bambassi of 
Assosa zone, where the combined presence of non-indigenous groups accounts 
for the majority, Bertas occupy all the allocated 6 seats.102 Since there is no 
strong political party within the region exclusively established for the non-
indigenous communities that presents candidates for electoral competition,103 
the non-indigenous communities either do not vote or if they vote, they will only 
vote for the available indigenous candidate submitted by the region‟s ruling 
party – Benishangul Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP).104  
Second, in the absence of strong opposition, the BGPDP, without a clear 
formula, submits non-indigenous representatives in some woredas and omits 
their presence in others. This is clearly visible in the technique the party uses 
towards ensuring the proportional presence of indigenous nationalities where 
they conjointly are a (numerical and political) majority. In such circumstances, 
since all indigenous nationalities run through one political party of BGPDP, the 
party apparatus carefully selects candidates to avoid splitting of votes amongst 
the indigenous nationalities. One common mechanism for this is, if for instance, 
in a woreda like Bulen (which has 6 delegates to the state council), where 
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Gumuz and Shinasha together constitute a numerical majority, the six 
representatives are apportioned between Gumuz and Shinasha. Accordingly, 4 
candidates from Shinasha and 2 candidates from Gumuz are submitted by the 
BGPDP. This, however, is not replicated in woredas where the non-indigenous 
communities are found in a combined majority.  
Third, even in woredas where the representation of the non-indigenous 
communities is permitted, the number of representatives to the regional council 
from that particular woreda is significantly less than the number of 
representatives from a woreda where indigenous nationalities are elected. For 
instance, in Pawe, Amharas constitute a numerical 50+1 majority. Pawe woreda 
can only send 4 representatives whereas woredas in Assossa zone are allowed to 
elect six representatives each. Even from Pawe woreda, which has an allocated 4 
representatives to the state council, only 3 are ethnic Amharas and a Kambata 
fills the remaining seat. However, all of the four representatives run through the 
party ticket of the region‟s ruling party.  
In the region of Oromia, the reality on the ground reveals that the region, 
despite being largely constituted by Oromos (88%), is also inhabited by diverse 
ethnic groups (accounting for 12% of the regional population).105 Yet, all the 
representatives of the state council are ethnic Oromos.106 Even though a clear-
cut statistical data is not available with regard to a 50+1 majority in each of the 
179 electoral constituencies, the numerical 50+1 dominance of Oromos at the 
regional, zonal, and in many of the woreda levels implies that Oromos continue 
to constitute 50+1 majority in the electoral constituencies as well.107 
Emboldened by the manner of forming electoral constituencies and the 
exclusionary elements of the electoral law (such as its language proficiency 
requirement and FPTP), a region home to millions of non-Oromos, does not 
even give nominal representation to its non-indigenous communities, just like 
the region of Benishangul Gumuz. 
5. Westminster democracy in an ethnically plural society: 
Which way forward? 
Additional to electing representatives through the FPTP electoral system, 
according to the FDRE Constitution, all decisions of the HoPR are taken by a 
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(simple) majority vote of members present and voting.108 Decision-making 
procedures in the regional states also follow similar trends of majoritarian 
(50+1) democracy.109 For what it is worse, the exercise of government power in 
the regional states has been elusive for their minorities. Typically, the 
(politically) dominant or majority ethnic group considers itself as the „owner‟ of 
the regional state, threatening the individual as well as group specific rights of 
its minorities.110 As Lijphart repeatedly described, in plural societies simple 
majority rule, which sees the winner takes all practice, is both dangerous and 
undemocratic.111 In fact, federalism, best functions in circumstances of 
consensus, where power is legitimately shared between different contending 
groups.112  
Yet, the Ethiopian ethno-federal setup has not put in place sufficient 
constitutional guarantees.  Four factors, among others, can be noted in this 
regard. First, there are no power-sharing arrangements over and above 
legislative representation between the different ethnic communities in the 
executive, judiciary and other institutions like the police and the military.113 
Despite the existence of Article 39(3) of the FDRE Constitution, which, 
arguably, provides for some sort of power sharing between contending groups at 
federal and regional levels, as Getachew rightly noted, the Constitution has not 
taken this provision further and supplemented it with clear rules and guidelines 
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to make it effective.114 Secondly, Ethiopia has no effective reserved (guaranteed) 
seats and quota systems for ethnic minorities, particularly, in legislative bodies 
(national, subnational or local parliaments) for the representation of minority 
groups, mostly, outside of electoral competition. As Verstichel explains, this is a 
mechanism, which does not only promote minority representation, but one that 
effectively guarantees their representation.115  
Under Article 54(3) of the FDRE Constitution, „minority nationalities and 
peoples‟ are guaranteed representation through reserved seats in the HoPR. 
„Minority nationality and peoples‟, however, refers merely to those particular 
ethnic groups that do not have sufficient number of people that can make up an 
electoral constituency for representation to the HoPR. Thus, other requirements 
in the determination of minority status (such as the issue of non-dominance at 
the regional level) are not considered as legitimate grounds to warrant 
representation, which in effect means no guaranteed representation for regional 
minorities. And for those who are represented, as discussed earlier, the 
majoritarian decision-making procedure undermines their presence, since 
decisions will eventually be made by the majority of the day. 
Another mechanism for increasing the influence of a minority is through a 
quota system. This is a policy of ensuring that a specified number or percentage 
of minority groups become members of, let us say a national or subnational 
parliaments, party lists, etc.116 For this, for instance, political parties may 
spontaneously or for electoral convenience allocate quotas for persons 
belonging to minorities among the candidates on their lists.117  
In the case of Ethiopia, an informal quota scheme –without a legal 
framework– seems to run through the EPRDF party system. For example, party 
lists of EPRDF always consist of members of native identities when contesting 
in particular minority sensitive areas, like selecting an Agew candidate in areas 
where Agews are found in huge numbers within an electoral constituency. Yet, 
since this is done without adequate legal guarantees, EPRDF can take it away at 
any moment – leaving minorities at its mercy.  
The third factor that needs attention relates to absence of veto power to 
minorities. In the constitutional design of some countries, minorities are given 
veto powers with respect to certain matters, which are considered to be of a 
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particular concern to them.118 The justification behind veto rights is that the 
consent of minority representatives is necessary before going ahead with the 
enactment of certain legislation in parliaments. The minority veto can be either 
an absolute veto (which empowers minorities to utterly defeat a bill in some 
situations) or a suspensive one (which only challenges the majority of the day to 
reconsider its legislative choices).119 This, as Lijphart explains, may be applied 
either to all decisions or to only certain specified kinds of decisions.120 Veto 
rights, besides creating a sense of ownership of the state, also empower 
minorities to significantly influence decisions made at the center. Veto power is 
commonly understood as a valuable mechanism to shield the minority from the 
„tyranny of the majority‟. In Ethiopia, no veto rights are available for ethnic 
minorities at the federal or regional parliaments, which enable them to counter 
decisions affecting their interests.  
The fourth factor in the absence of constitutional guarantees to minorities is 
related with lack of consultative mechanisms that aim to avert the dangers of 
majoritarian democracy. Consultative mechanisms are increasingly seen as a 
space in which minority political groups, civil society representatives and 
governmental bodies can interact, and where the views, concerns and interests 
of minorities can be effectively incorporated within the process of policy 
planning, implementation and evaluation.121  
Minority consultative bodies are important for the effective participation of 
minorities in two dimensions. First, where minorities are not fully represented 
in elected bodies, their lack of co-decision making can be compensated through 
the process of consultation before decisions are taken. Second, even where 
minorities are represented, given their non-dominant position in the 
representative/elected bodies, consultative mechanisms often prove effective in 
transmitting the interests of minority constituencies into the legislative or 
political decision making process.122 Although these consultative mechanisms 
take on different functions in different contexts, it is asserted that their effective 
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performance widely depends upon their inclusive representation, active 
participation and commitment among the minority representatives, as well as the 
availability of sufficient resources and their operation independent from political 
interference.123 Unfortunately, no such mechanisms exist in Ethiopia.  
Conclusion  
In ethnically plural societies like Ethiopia that seek to manage ethnic diversity, 
equitable representation of ethnic communities is very crucial. Ethiopia adopted 
the plurality system in order to ensure equitable ethnic representation, despite 
the clear anomaly it poses to ethnic minorities. In what seems to be recognition 
of this abnormality, there now appears a strong desire to move away from the 
plurality system.  
While a change in the electoral system is long overdue, this article has shown 
that a simple shift in an electoral system without giving due attention to various 
concerns (that need to be addressed) will not be fruitful. These concerns include 
the holding of free and fair elections, the impact of ethnic voting, a constitutional 
design that facilitates ethnic representation, the role of political parties, and the 
widening of the political space. In the absence of these settings and where no 
change is made to the manner of establishing electoral constituencies and simple 
majority rules of decision making (at federal and regional legislative bodies), the 
desired outcome of having alternative voices that have meaningful influence 
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